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Ukrainophile Activism and Imperial 
Governance in Russia’s Southwestern 
Borderlands
Faith hillis
Throughout the 19th century, a “Ukrainian question” haunted the Russian 
Empire. In the early 1800s, ethnic Ukrainian (or as official circles then called 
them, Little Russian) nobles came to see themselves as leaders of a historical 
nation whose origins they traced to Kievan Rus´ and the Cossack hetmanate.1 
By mid-century, Little Russian elites infused this historical sensibility with 
political content, initiating a Ukrainian “national awakening.” In the 1840s, 
the Cyrillo-Methodian Society, a clandestine organization, called for Little 
Russians to reclaim the freedoms and equality of their Cossack ancestors by 
forming a federation of Slavic nations. By the 1860s–70s, populist activists 
known as khlopomany (roughly, fans of the peasantry) and members of cultural 
associations called Hromady worked to protect and promote folk traditions 
and the Ukrainian language.2 As growing segments of Little Russian society 
I gratefully acknowledge the support of the International Research and Exchanges Board 
(IREX) and the Fulbright-Hays Program, which funded the research featured in this article. 
I would also like to express my appreciation to Laura Engelstein, Paul Bushkovitch, Timothy 
Snyder, the participants of Russian history reading groups at Columbia and Yale universities, 
and Kritika’s editors and anonymous referees, whose comments and suggestions improved 
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 1  This historical consciousness was both shaped and reflected by Istoriia rusov, an anonymous 
tract circulated widely among the Little Russian gentry in the early 19th century. See Serhii 
Plokhy, “Ukraine or Little Russia? Revisiting an Early Nineteenth-Century Debate,” Canadian 
Slavonic Papers 48, 3–4 (2006): 335–54.
 2 Recent analyses of Ukraine’s “national awakening” include Iaroslav Hrytsak, Narys istorii 
Ukrainy: Formuvannia modernoi ukrains´koi natsii XIX–XX stolittia (Kyiv: Heneza, 2000); 
Andreas Kappeler, Der schwierige Weg zur Nation (Vienna: Böhlau, 2003); Alexei Miller, The 
Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century (New York: 
Central European University Press, 2003); Ricarda Vulpius, Nationalisierung der Religion: 
Russifizierungspolitik und ukrainische Nationsbildung, 1860–1920 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 
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discovered a common experience distinct from all-Russian culture, new 
generations of activists would begin the struggle to build a Ukrainian political 
nation on these cultural foundations.3
The existing literature on the Ukrainian question in the 19th century 
emphasizes the intensifying conflict between the heralds of Ukrainian 
national awakening and the bureaucrats who governed the immense and 
ethnically diverse empire. As Russian intellectuals gradually disavowed their 
earlier interest in Little Russia’s cultural peculiarities, which they began to 
see as a challenge to the emergent myth that Great, Little, and White Russia 
constituted a single and indivisible triune nation, officials liquidated the 
Cyrillo-Methodian Society and exiled its leaders.4 By mid-century, bureaucrats 
placed official limits on Ukrainian cultural expression. In 1863, P. A. Valuev, 
the minister of the interior, penned a circular banning the publication of 
Ukrainian-language materials aimed at a popular audience. In 1876, Tsar 
Alexander II issued the Ems Decree, which introduced additional injunctions 
against the use of Ukrainian in public life and exiled leading Ukrainophile 
activists. Scholars continue to debate the aims of these policies, but they are 
commonly regarded as evidence of bureaucrats’ growing antipathy toward 
Little Russian particularism, which officials feared would undermine imperial 
stability and the myth of a triune, all-Russian nation.5
2005); and Serhy Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007).
 3 H. V. Kas´ianov, Ukrains´ka intelihentsiia na rubezhi XIX–XX stolit: Sotsial´no-politychnyi 
portret (Kyiv: Lybid´, 1993); Volodymyr Holovchenko, Vid “Samostiinoi Ukrainy” do soiuzu 
vyzvolennia Ukrainy: Narysy z istorii ukrains´koi sotsial-demokratii pochatku XX st. (Khar´kiv: 
Maidan, 1996); Olga Andriewsky, “The Politics of National Identity: The Ukrainian Question 
in Russia, 1904–12” (Ph.D. diss, Harvard University, 1991).
 4 David Saunders, The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850 (Edmonton: 
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1985), 231–34; Olga Andriewsky, “The Russian–
Ukrainian Discourse and the Failure of the ‘Little Russian Solution,’ 1782–1917,” in Culture, 
Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian–Russian Encounter (1600–1945), ed. Andreas Kappeler, 
Zenon E. Kohut, Frank E. Sysyn, and Mark von Hagen (Edmonton: Canadian Institute 
of Ukrainian Studies, 2003), 182–214. On the “all-Russian nation,” see Miller, Ukrainian 
Question; Vulpius, Nationalisierung der Religion; and Andreas Renner, Russischer Nationalismus 
und Öffentlichkeit im Zarenreich, 1855–1875 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2000).
 5 See Fedir Savchenko, Zaborona ukrainstva 1876 r. (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1970); 
Witold Rodkiewicz, Russian Nationality Policy in the Western Provinces of the Empire (1863–
1905) (Lublin: Scientific Society of Lublin, 1998), 192–213; Miller, Ukrainian Question, 
97–126, 179–97; Vulpius, Nationalisierung der Religion, 126–40; David Saunders, “Russia 
and Ukraine under Alexander II: The Valuev Edict of 1863,” International History Review 
17, 1 (1995): 23–50; Johannes Remy, “The Valuev Circular and Censorship of Ukrainian 
Publications in the Russian Empire (1863–1876): Intention and Practice,” Canadian Slavonic 
Papers 49, 1–2 (2007): 87–110; and Andrii Danylenko, “The Ukrainian Bible and the Valuev 
Circular of July 18, 1863,” Acta Slavica Japonica 28 (2010): 1–21. 
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It is beyond dispute that some officials feared that growing awareness of 
Ukrainian culture would alienate Little Russians from the empire and that 
the bureaucratic apparatus worked to prevent the emergence of Ukrainian 
national separatism. It is less often remarked, however, that throughout 
the middle third of the 19th century, influential segments of the imperial 
bureaucracy viewed Little Russian ethno-national consciousness not as a 
threat but as a powerful weapon in the official struggle to combat Polish 
influence on Russia’s western frontier.6 Focusing on Kiev—the most active 
center of Ukrainophile agitation and the administrative center of the empire’s 
southwestern borderlands—this article demonstrates that the support 
offered to local activists by the St. Petersburg ministries and especially the 
Kiev governor-general’s office played a decisive role in the consolidation 
of a Ukrainian cultural nation.7 Official engagement in the elaboration of 
Ukrainophile ideas in Kiev—and the state’s attempts to shape and control 
these ideas—profoundly influenced the empire’s nascent national identities 
and challenged its long-term stability.
During the 19th century, imperial officials were engaged in a fierce 
struggle against the Polish-Catholic nobility (szlachta), which had ruled 
right-bank Ukraine (the lands west of the Dnieper) during the early modern 
period, remained the dominant social group in the region, and rose up twice 
(1830–31 and 1863) in failed attempts to resurrect the Polish state. Noting 
that Little Russian patriots sharply defined themselves against Polish-Catholic 
culture, envisioned the southwestern borderlands as primordially Orthodox, 
and argued that the local simple folk (narod ), not the szlachta, were the 
 6 Several works note periodic convergences in the interests of local officials and Ukrainophile 
activists and cases in which Russian and Ukrainian identities overlapped after the mid-19th 
century. See Miller, Ukrainian Question; Vulpius, Nationalisierung der Religion; and Rodkiewicz, 
Russian Nationality Policy. Nevertheless, all these authors focus on the competition between 
Russian nation builders and Ukrainian national awakeners. 
 7 Terminology presents a challenge to historians of 19th-century Ukraine, since terms such 
as “Little Russian” and “Ukrainophile” have come to carry specific ideological connotations. 
The former is often understood to refer to ethnic Ukrainians who considered themselves 
assimilated subjects of the Russian Empire; the latter, to more radical thinkers who envisioned 
an autonomous Ukrainian nation. This piece questions the utility of these distinctions, since 
it charts out the long history of cooperation between individuals who have been assigned to 
the “Little Russian” and “Ukrainophile” camps. This article uses the terms “Little Russian” and 
“Ukrainophile” interchangeably to describe activists who expressed pride in their native culture 
and aimed to popularize it. I reserve the term “Ukrainians” to refer to a later generation of 
nationalist activists who openly worked toward the establishment of a Ukrainian state. Since 
the discussions highlighted in this article were being carried out in the Russian Empire and 
primarily in the Russian language, I have transliterated personal names from Russian, with the 
exception of later Ukrainian activists such as Hrushevs´kyi, who explicitly rejected a Russian 
imperial identity.
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rightful owners of the region’s resources, influential segments of the imperial 
bureaucracy regarded Ukrainophile activists as valuable allies in the campaign 
to claim the borderlands for the empire. Consequently, officials permitted 
(and even subsidized) activists’ efforts to create a national history, promote 
the Ukrainian language, and establish unmediated contact with the masses—
the tasks classically associated with national awakening. Indeed, bureaucrats 
reached out even to the most radical khlopomany and hromadtsy, whose 
populist ideologies they hoped would undermine the power of the szlachta. In 
their effort to enlist Little Russians in the struggle against Polish civilization, 
officials thus embarked on an innovative effort to channel the mobilizational 
power of ethno-national ideas in a “healthy” direction that would reinforce 
rather than undermine the unity of the empire.8
Of course, the experiment unfolding in Kiev faced serious limitations. 
Bureaucrats constantly monitored Ukrainophile activities to ensure that 
they did not jeopardize the integrity of the empire, and they used repressive 
measures such as the Valuev decree to quash manifestations of Little Russian 
patriotism that they deemed potentially dangerous. Nevertheless, through the 
1870s, Little Russian activists remained key players in the official reclamation 
of the southwestern borderlands from Polish-Catholic civilization. Indeed, 
it was after the Valuev decree of 1863 that Kiev Ukrainophiles reached the 
height of their power and influence, launching new public outreach efforts 
and securing permission to erect a monument to the 17th-century Cossack 
hetman Bogdan Khmel´nitskii—a venture that I discuss in depth below. 
By the 1870s, as the political threat posed by the szlachta of the southwest 
receded, officials began to express more consistent concern about the radical 
ideas of Kiev’s Ukrainophiles and the influence they enjoyed. As bureaucrats 
moved to restrain the Kiev experiment—and revoked their earlier support 
for the Khmel´nitskii project—rifts emerged among the city’s activists. The 
conflict and denunciations that ensued led directly to the promulgation of the 
 8 Recent research on various corners of the empire illuminates the state’s role in promoting 
ideas and policies that advanced national consciousness. On imperial promotion of all-Russian 
nationalism, see Andrei Zorin, Kormia dvuglavogo orla: Literatura i gosudarstvennaia ideologiia 
v Rossii v poslednei treti XVIII–pervoi treti XIX veka (Moscow: NLO, 2001), 337–73; and 
Alexei Miller, The Romanov Empire and Nationalism: Essays in the Methodology of Historical 
Research (New York: Central European University Press, 2008). On non-Russian national 
ideas, see Charles Steinwedel, “To Make a Difference: The Category of Ethnicity in Late 
Imperial Russian Politics, 1861–1917,” in Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices, ed. 
David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000), 67–86; Bradley D. 
Woodworth, “Civil Society and Nationality in the Multiethnic Russian Empire: Tallinn/Reval, 
1860–1914” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 2003); Matti Klinge, Imperskaia Finliandiia (St. 
Petersburg: Kolo, 2005); and Michael Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of 
the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908–1918 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
UKRAINOPHILE ACTIVISM AND IMPERIAL GOVERNANCE 305
Ems Decree in 1876, which marked the end of the Kiev experiment. Little 
Russians now began to splinter into groups of self-proclaimed Ukrainian 
and Russian nationalists, both of which built on the ideas that activists had 
refined under state tutelage. The former, emphasizing their native land’s 
unique culture and history, argued that the Ukrainian nation should be 
liberated from tsarist rule. The latter denied the very existence of a Ukrainian 
nation, arguing that Little Russians had always been the most loyal defenders 
of the Russian nation. Unable to control the social and ideological forces of 
nationalism that they had unleashed, the very bureaucrats who attempted 
to use Little Russian patriotism to save the empire had unwittingly created 
mutually hostile national communities that hastened its demise.
The Origins of the Kiev Experiment 
Following the 1830–31 revolt of the szlachta, the imperial state launched 
an ambitious program to vanquish Polish influence in right-bank Ukraine. 
The region’s newly appointed governor-general closed Polish schools and 
banks, revoked Magdeburg law, and resurrected Vil´na’s closed university—
where Polish rebels had freely conspired—in Kiev, naming the institution St. 
Vladimir’s, in honor of the Kievan Rus´ ruler who had converted to Eastern 
Christianity.9 From its earliest days, the official de-Polonization campaign 
relied heavily on the Little Russian gentry who hailed from the left bank of 
the Dnieper, the heart of the former Cossack hetmanate. Devout Orthodox 
believers who deplored Polish patrimony and proudly traced their heritage 
to Cossack officers, these nobles flocked to post-revolt Kiev to work in the 
governor-general’s office and at St. Vladimir’s. In 1840, M. A. Maksimovich, a 
Poltava nobleman and the first rector of St. Vladimir’s, launched the historical 
journal Kievlianin, which celebrated the cultural peculiarities of “southern 
Russia” as well as the role the region had played in defending the Russian 
Empire from Catholic incursions.10 A small circle of local history enthusiasts, 
which included high-ranking church officials and M. V. Iuzefovich, a Poltava 
native and an employee of the governor-general’s office, soon formed around 
Maksimovich.11 Declaring their desire to unearth an “authentic” Kiev 
 9 Daniel Beauvois, Le noble, le serf et le revizor: La noblesse polonaise entre le tsarisme et les 
masses ukrainiennes, 1831–1863 (Paris: Éditions des Archives contemporaines, 1985); 
Valentyna Shandra, Kyivs´ke heneral-hubernatorstvo, 1832–1914 (Kyiv: UDNDIASD, 1999); 
Ol´ha Tarasenko, Stanovlennia ta rozvytok istorychnoi osvity i nauky u Kyivs´komu universyteti u 
1834–1884 rr. (Kyiv: Lohos, 1995).
10 See M. A. Maksimovich, Kievlianin (Kiev: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1840–50). 
11 On early local history circles, see O. I. Levitskii, Piatidesiatiletie Kievskoi Kommissii 
dlia razbora drevnikh aktov, 1843–1893: Istoricheskaia zapiska o ee deiatel´nosti (Kiev: S. V. 
Kul´zhenko, 1893), 9–10.
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unsullied by Catholic influence, these men played an active role in official 
commissions tasked with rechristening streets whose names were derived 
from Polish, excavating archeological sites of the Kievan Rus´ period, and 
gathering manuscripts related to the history of Orthodoxy in Kiev.12 
In 1843, Governor-General D. G. Bibikov convened the Commission 
for the Analysis of Historical Documents to coordinate the activities of local 
history enthusiasts and to claim Kiev—where Polish language and culture 
retained a prominent presence among the local bureaucracy and high 
society—as a primordially Orthodox locale.13 The group—which aimed to 
collect and publish documents pertaining to local antiquity, folk customs, 
and church history—devoted special attention to the suffering of the Little 
Russian people under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, charging that 
the szlachta, along with Jewish bankers and estate managers, had conspired to 
tear the simple folk from their Orthodox faith and destroy their language and 
culture.14 Group leaders, who hoped to redress historical injustices through 
their exposés, also insisted on the importance of publishing historical sources 
in Ukrainian—which, they argued, lent the materials emotional authenticity.15 
Within a few years of its founding, the commission had become an influential 
interest group and an important social outlet for Kiev’s Orthodox educated 
society, uniting gentry intellectuals such as Maksimovich and Iuzefovich; the 
region’s few great Orthodox magnates, such as N. A. Rigel´man and G. P. 
Galagan; and local clergy.16 
In the late 1840s, the Little Russian experiment unfolding in Kiev was 
tested by the infiltration of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society and the arrest of 
its organizers. The society’s liquidation seemed to bode poorly for the future 
12 M. O. Rybakov, Nevidomi ta malovidomi storinky istorii Kyiva (Kyiv: Kyi, 1997), 186–
90; Derzhavnyi Arkhiv mista Kyiva (DAK) f. 17 (Kievskaia gorodskaia duma), op. 4, d. 949 
(“Delo o provedenii rabot po predokhraneniiu ot razrusheniia pamiatnika ‘Zolotye vorota,’ ” 
1868–69).  
13 Sbornik statei i materialov po istorii iugo-zapadnoi Rossii, izdavaemyi Kommissiei dlia razbora 
drevnikh aktov, sostoiashchei pri Kievskom, Podol´skom i Volynskom general-gubernatore (Kiev: 
N. T. Korchak-Novitskii, 1911), 1:1 (third pagination).
14 Levitskii, Piatidesiatiletie, 26; see also O. I. Levitskii, ed., Pamiatniki, izdannye Vremennoi 
komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov (Kiev: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1898).  
15 Levitskii, Pamiatniki, v.
16 Levitskii, Piatidesiatiletie, 138. A Poltava nobleman who worked the governor-general’s 
office, Rigel´man was descended from a szlachta clan of German origins that had converted 
to Orthodoxy. Galagan, a Chernigov noble and Rigel´man’s cousin, was known for his 
philanthropy and founded a Ukrainophilic school in Kiev. See Ocherk deiatel´nosti Kievskogo 
slavianskogo blagotvoritel´nogo obshchestva za 25 let ego sushchestvovaniia, 1869–1894 (Kiev: 
S. V. Kul´zhenko, 1904), 57–60; and F. Mishchenko, G. P. Galagan (Nekrolog) (Kiev: G. T. 
Korchak-Novitskii, 1888).
UKRAINOPHILE ACTIVISM AND IMPERIAL GOVERNANCE 307
of the Commission for the Analysis of Historical Documents, considering 
that several of the conspirators—the historians P. A. Kulish and N. I. 
Kostomarov and the peasant bard T. G. Shevchenko—played an active role 
on the commission.17 Furthermore, although the commission was a fully legal 
organization that had stopped short of advocating a federalist arrangement 
between Little and Great Russia, its members shared the Cyrillo-Methodians’ 
pride in local culture and abhorrence for the suffering of the Little Russian 
people under “foreign” exploitation.18 In the end, though, officials, concerned 
that excessive punishment of the conspirators might jeopardize further Little 
Russian participation in the de-Polonization campaign, opted to mitigate the 
punishments meted out to the conspirators.19 Meanwhile, the activities of 
the commission continued unmolested. 
By the 1850s, the views of commission members had become even more 
aligned with the radical populism of Cyrillo-Methodian ideology. Several 
of the group’s members embarked on studies of Cossack Hetman Bogdan 
Khmel´nitskii, who between 1648 and 1657 led regular armies as well as 
bands of armed peasants in a series of wars that freed the central Dnieper 
from Polish–Lithuanian rule and saw brutal attacks against the region’s Polish 
and Jewish populations.20 As the commission’s official publication put it, 
Polish rule of Little Russia had broken the “internal moral bond between 
the aristocracy and the people,” “subjugated the simple folk to the unlimited 
17 Sbornik statei, 1:36–37 (third pagination). Indeed, Kulish considered Rigel´man and 
Iuzefovich his mentors. Iuzefovich is often portrayed as a foe of Ukrainian culture. As his 
contemporaries noted, however, he was a devoted Ukrainophile until the 1870s. See Orest 
Levyts´kyi, “ ‘Ukrainofilam’ (Nevidomyi tvir P. Kulisha),” Zapysky Ukrains´koho naukovoho 
tovarystva v Kyivi, bk. 7 (1911): 63–68; I.  O. Dzeverin et al., eds., “Zhizn´ Kulisha,” in 
Panteleimon Kulish: Tvory v dvokh tomakh (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1998), 1:243–44; and 
“Pis´ma P. A. Kulisha k M. V. Iuzefovichu (1843–1861 g.g.),” Kievskaia starina 64, 2 (1899): 
185–208. 
18 “Opovidaniia A.  A. Soltanovs´koho pro kyivs´ke zhyttia 1840-kh rr.,” Ukraina, no. 
3 (1924): 77–98. For further details on the conspiracy, see P.  A. Zaionchkovskii, Kirillo-
Mefodievskoe obshchestvo, 1846–1847 (Moscow: Izdatel´stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1959); 
and P. S. Sokhan´, ed., Kyrylo-Mefodiivs´ke tovarystvo, 3 vols. (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1990).
19 Miller, Ukrainian Question, 53–54; this is also the argument of Zaionchkovskii, Kirillo-
Mefodievskoe obshchestvo. Most of the conspirators were sent to interior Russian provinces to 
serve local bureaucracies; Shevchenko, whose magnetic personality alarmed Nicholas I, received 
the harshest sentence—one year’s imprisonment followed by state service on ethnographic 
expeditions. 
20 On the controversial legacy of the revolt, see Frank E. Sysyn, “The Jewish Factor in the 
Khmelnytsky Uprising,” in Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective, ed. Peter J. 
Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988), 
43–54; Serhii Plokhy, “The Ghosts of Pereiaslav: Russo-Ukrainian Historical Debates in the 
Post-Soviet Era,” Europe–Asia Studies 53, 3 (2001): 489–505.
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power of aristocrats, torn them from their faith, and led them to despise their 
own nationality [narodnost´ ].”21 Maksimovich’s 1857 study of Khmel´nitskii 
hailed the hetman as a popular hero whose violent acts not only delivered the 
Little Russian people from Polish oppression but also reforged the broken 
links between elites and masses.22 Likewise, Kulish praised the violence of 
“Mr. Khmel´nitskii, the bloodletter,” as a redemptive force that had liberated 
the simple folk from the “damned szlachta.”23 The group’s continued praise for 
the glories of the hetmanate—and open admiration for peasant jacqueries—in 
1853 prompted St. Petersburg to remind Kiev intellectuals not to let their 
passion for the “nationality or language of Little Russia” to “outweigh one’s 
love for the fatherland—that is, the empire.”24 Nevertheless, the Kiev governor-
general’s office, which continued to underwrite the group’s expeditions and 
publications, remained steadfast in its support for the commission, further 
sanctioning its views by creating an archive at St. Vladimir’s to house the 
500,000 documents that it had by then collected.25
By 1860, Polish patriots had renewed their efforts to incite an uprising 
against the tsarist order among both educated society and the peasant 
masses.26 However, a small circle of young Polish nobles in Kiev, led by the St. 
Vladimir’s student V. B. Antonovich, renounced revanchist patriotism and the 
estate interests of the szlachta, declaring themselves men of the people. These 
so-called khlopomany donned traditional folk costumes, learned Ukrainian, 
and traveled the countryside, denouncing “any form of coercion [nasyl´stvo], 
the domination of one ethnicity [narodnost´ ] over another, the exploitation 
[vykorystovuvannia] of one social stratum by another.”27 As they sought to 
educate and “uplift” the peasantry, these populist activists also hailed the 
masses as the true carriers of the Ukrainian national spirit, recording their 
folk songs, costumes, and customs.
21 Arkhiv iugo-zapadnoi Rossii (Kiev: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1859), 1, 1: lxxxvi. 
22 M. A. Maksimovich, Vospominanie o Bogdane Khmel´nitskom (Kiev, 1857), 68.
23 Dzeverin, Panteleimon Kulish, 1:351, 287. 
24 “Tsenzura v tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaia I,” Russkaia starina (February 1904): 441. 
25 “Tsentral´nye arkhivy drevnikh aktovykh knig: Vilenskii i Kievskii,” Zhurnal Ministerstva 
narodnogo prosveshcheniia (1883): 37; Levitskii, Piatidesiatiletie Kievskoi Kommissii, 14. 
26 See G. I. Marakhov, Sotsial´no-politicheskaia bor´ba na Ukraine v 50–60-e gody XIX veka 
(Kiev: Vyshcha shkola, 1981). 
27 Quoted from Mik. Hrushevs´kyi, “Volodymyr Antonovych, osnovni idei ioho tvorchosty 
i diial´nosty,” Zapysky Ukrains´koho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyivi, no. 3 (1908): 13. On the 
rift between Polish patriots and the khlopomany, see Natsional´na biblioteka Ukrainy imeni 
V. I. Vernads´koho, Instytut rukopysu (NBU IR), I. 8076 (O. Levits´kyi. Storinka z zhyttia 
Volodymyra Antonovycha), ll. 4–5.
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Leading Ukrainophiles embraced the khlopomany, whose anti-Polish 
fervor and influence among the peasant masses they saw as a powerful new 
weapon in the battle against the szlachta. In 1861, prominent commission 
members (Rigel´man, Galagan, and Iuzefovich), Cyrillo-Methodian alumni 
(Kostomarov, Kulish), and radical student leaders (Antonovich), joined forces 
to launch the Russian and Ukrainian-language journal Osnova. Published in 
St. Petersburg, the journal aspired to raise awareness of Little Russian history, 
culture, and language across the empire. Antonovich denounced the szlachta’s 
“religious fanaticism, estate egoism, disrespect for human rights [ prava 
lichnosti ], the enslavement of the peasantry, and arbitrariness in all arenas 
of social life” in the journal’s pages; Kulish called for the need to publish 
Ukrainian books and compile a Ukrainian-language dictionary.28
Commercially unsuccessful, Osnova ceased publication in 1862, but 
the Kiev Hromada would carry on its mission. Run by Antonovich and 
financed by Galagan, the circle continued Osnova’s efforts to compile a 
Ukrainian dictionary, to promote Ukrainian literature, and “to protect 
the morals, customs, and costumes of the Little Russian nationality.”29 If 
other Ukrainophile ventures had long insisted that organic, spiritual bonds 
connected Little Russian elites with the narod, hromadtsy now established 
unmediated contact with the simple folk, organizing public readings of 
Shevchenko to peasants, attempting to convert Roman and Greek Catholic 
believers to Orthodoxy, and operating more than a hundred Sunday schools.30 
Despite their radical views, Ukrainophile activities in the early 1860s 
received substantial support from both Kiev and St. Petersburg officials, who 
recognized their potential to complement the official campaign to impugn 
Polish historical claims on the southwestern borderlands and to diminish 
the political power of the szlachta. N. I. Pirogov, the curator of the Kiev 
school district, praised Hromada Sunday schools as valuable forms of 
28 V. B. Antonovich, “Moia ispoved´,” Osnova (January 1862): 86; P. A. Kulish, “Ob izdanii 
ukrainskogo slovaria,” Osnova (March 1862): 333–34. For a description of the journal’s goals, 
see Osnova (January 1861): 2–5.
29 Quoted from Savchenko, Zaborona ukrainstva, 186; see also A.  A. Rusov, “Kak ia stal 
chlenom ‘hromady,’ ” Ukrainskaia zhizn´, no. 10 (1913): 40–49; V. Miiakovskii, “Kievskaia 
gromada,” Litopys´ revoliutsii, no. 4 (1924): 127–50; and Ihnat Zhytets´kyi, “Kyivs´ka 
Hromada za 60-tykh rokiv,” Ukraina, no. 1 (1928): 91–125. On Galagan’s financial support, 
see Efraim Vol´f, K istorii ukrainskogo i evreiskogo natsional´nykh dvizhenii do 1917 (Jerusalem: 
VERBA Publishers, 2000), 33.
30 See “Avtobiograficheskaia zametka,” in Mykhailo Petrovych Drahomanov: Literaturno-
publitsystychni pratsi (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1970), 1:40–45; Boris P—skii, “Vospominanie 
iz nedalekogo proshlogo,” Kievskaia starina 11, 2 (1885): 235–67; V. Shcherbina, “Hovors´kyi 
ta Kalistrativ (Z kyivs´koho zhittia 60-kh rr. XIX st.),” Hovors´kyi Ukraina, no. 5 (1927): 57; 
Saunders, “Russia and Ukraine,” 34. 
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“Russo-Little Russian propaganda.”31 Meanwhile, St. Petersburg bureaucrats 
recognized Osnova as a legal publication, commissioned Kulish to translate 
the Emancipation Manifesto into Ukrainian, and permitted Kostomarov and 
Shevchenko to distribute Ukrainian primers and solicit funds to support the 
publication of Ukrainian-language literature.32 
Some prominent government officials, however, expressed more con-
cern about the emerging alliance between the imperial bureaucracy and 
Ukrainophile activists. Minister of the Interior P. A. Valuev, who fixated on 
the Polish origins of some self-proclaimed Little Russian activists, feared that 
Polish revanchists might use Ukrainophile activities to disguise their efforts 
to resurrect the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.33 As Ukrainophile ac-
tivism grew more pervasive in the southwestern borderlands, St. Petersburg 
convened special investigatory commissions to monitor local developments 
and to ensure that they did not undermine the foundations of autocratic 
rule. These groups deemed the actions of a handful of activists potentially 
dangerous. For example, an 1862 investigation into allegations that P. P. 
Chubinskii—a khlopoman, member of the Kiev Hromada, and contributor 
to Osnova—attempted to incite peasants to attack Polish nobles concluded: 
“although it has not factually been proven that Chubinskii incited peasants 
in any anti-government movement, allowing similar attempts to continue 
… could have a dangerous influence on the minds of the simple folk.”34 In 
his correspondence with a friend, Chubinskii mocked the notion that he 
could be an “enemy of the government” that, in the emancipation decree of 
1861, “liberated 22 million slaves and gave them human rights [chelovecheskie 
prava].”35 Hromada activists, Kiev bureaucrats, and Kiev Governor-General 
I. I. Vasil´chikov himself dismissed the allegations as Polish intrigues designed 
31 N. I. Pirogov, “O voskresnykh shkolakh,” in his Sochineniia (St. Petersburg, 1887), 2:220. 
32 Saunders, “Russia and Ukraine,” 34, 38; Danylenko, “Ukrainian Bible,” 15. In left-bank 
Ukraine, which had never been Polish territory and lacked the Polish landed elite of the right 
bank, authorities were much less tolerant of Ukrainophile activities. On the mass arrests of 
left-bank Little Russian activists in the early 1860s—which in 1862 prompted the authorities 
to close Sunday schools empirewide—consult Saunders, “Russia and Ukraine,” 42–43.
33 Tsentral´nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy, m. Kyiv (TsDIAK) f. 707 (Kantseliariia 
popechitelia Kievskogo uchebnogo okruga), op. 261, d. 7, l.5 (Memorandum of Ministry of 
Education to Censorship Organs, 23 August 1861).
34 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (RGIA) f. 1282 (Kantseliarii Ministra 
vnutrennikh del), op. 1, d. 352 (Memorandum on P. P. Chubinskii’s record, 15 April 1876), 
ll. 54 ob.–55. For the content of Chubinskii’s speeches, see Savchenko, Zaborona Ukrainstva, 
350–51.
35 NBU IR I. 17930, l. 19 (P. P. Chubinskii to Ia. P. Polonskii, 11 June 1863), collected by Lev 
Peretts for the article “P. P. Chubinskii v ssylke i ego perepiska (1862–1869 gg.).”
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to disrupt the rapprochement between Ukrainophiles and the imperial state.36 
Nevertheless, St. Petersburg ordered Chubinskii to leave Kiev for a post at the 
Ministry of Communications in Arkhangel´sk and refused to permit him to 
return to Kiev until 1869. 
As the Chubinskii case demonstrates, imperial officials were determined 
to ensure that Ukrainophilism would not jeopardize the unity or stability 
of the empire. Even as they tried to manage the aims and influence of the 
movement, however, bureaucrats also recognized that the success of the 
de-Polonization campaign depended heavily on the participation of Little 
Russian activists. Within the Commission for the Analysis of Historical 
Documents, Ukrainophile ideas challenged the hegemony of Polish culture; 
the radically populist ventures undertaken by activists of the early 1860s 
rallied the power of the unschooled masses behind the imperial state. The 
coming revolt of 1863, as we shall see, would both challenge and solidify 
the experiment unfolding in Kiev, simultaneously rendering imperial officials 
more frightened of the potentially subversive impact of Little Russian activism 
and more dependent on it. 
Ukrainophilism and the 1863 Polish Revolt
By early 1863, large segments of the szlachta in the western borderlands had 
risen up against the imperial state, attacking arsenals and Russian officials 
and declaring a provisional government to rule the lands that had been lost 
to Russia in the Polish partitions.37 As chaos engulfed the southwest, St. 
Petersburg officials intensified their scrutiny of the Kiev experiment. In the 
spring of 1863, the Third Section received an anonymous denunciation that 
implored the authorities to halt ongoing efforts to translate the Gospels into 
Ukrainian. Claiming that the broader use of Ukrainian in local intellectual life 
would eventually challenge Russian as the lingua franca and thus undermine 
the cultural and political unity of the empire, the author of the letter portrayed 
36 TsDIAK f. 442, op. 812, d. 4, ll. 6–7 ob. (Memorandum to the chief of the Kiev police, 
17 January 1862); G.  I. Marakhov, Pol´skoe vosstanie 1863 g. na pravoberezhnoi Ukraine 
(Kiev: Izdatel´stvo Kievskogo universiteta, 1967), 136–37; Saunders, “Russia and Ukraine,” 
43–44; Shandra, Kyivs´ke heneral-hubernatorstvo, 31. As late as 1868, officials in the Kiev 
governor-general’s office would insist that Little Russian activists had remained loyal to the 
state throughout this period and that attempts to impugn their political reliability were Polish 
plots. See RGIA f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, ll. 130–31; continued on ll. 134–35 (1868 internal 
memorandum).
37 On the uprising in the southwestern borderlands, see Marakhov, Pol´skoe vosstanie; Otton 
Beiersdorf, “Kijów w powstaniu styczniowym,” in Kraków–Kijów: Szkice z Dziejów Stosunków 
Polsko-Ukraińskich, ed. Antoni Podrazy (Kraków: Wydawnictwo literackie Kraków, n.d.), 
73–130; and Tadeusz Bobrowski, Pamiętnik mojego życia (Warsaw: Państwowy instytut 
Wydawniczy, 1979). 
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the translation project as a bold first step toward the Ukrainophiles’ putative 
dream to achieve the “separation of Little Russia from Great Russia and a 
federation with Poland.”38 
In June 1863, the publicist M. N. Katkov, who just two years before 
had expressed his admiration for the unique features of Little Russia’s culture 
and language, raised similar concerns that Ukrainophile activity could 
undermine imperial unity at the precise moment when the tsarist regime was 
most vulnerable. “Ukraine has never had its own history, its own government 
… the Little Russian language never existed, and despite all the efforts of 
the Ukrainophiles, still does not exist,” Katkov wrote.39 Activists’ efforts to 
highlight the peculiarities of Little Russian culture, he complained, frustrated 
the empire’s efforts to present a united front against Polish civilization, thereby 
benefiting the “sworn enemies of their own Ukraine.”40 
Concerned officials took these allegations quite seriously. Asked to 
respond to the claims of the anonymous letter, Governor-General P.  V. 
Annenkov found the notion that Ukrainophiles would ally with Polish 
revanchists absurd, noting that the former worked tirelessly “to counteract 
Polish-Catholic [latino-pol´skaia] propaganda.” Nevertheless, he found it 
inappropriate to translate the Gospels into a “plebeian language that has no 
grammar and no literature”; and he urged that so long as “Polish intrigues” 
de stabilized the tsarist order, the “Little Russian party … should be subjected 
to vigilant supervision.”41 A June 1863 memorandum forwarded to St. 
Petersburg by the Kiev Censorship Committee echoed the notion that the 
proliferation of Little Russian literature among the masses might alienate 
peasants from a shared imperial culture and noted that Polish revanchists 
had openly discussed opportunities to use the Ukrainian language to turn the 
local population against the imperial state.42
Minister of the Interior Valuev now perceived a real risk that Little Russian 
patriotism, rather than reinforcing the de-Polonization campaign, would 
serve the interests of Polish revanchists. In July, he directed censors to prevent 
the publication of Ukrainian-language religious texts and primers until the 
38 RGIA f. 1282, op. 1, d. 166, ll. 7–7 ob. (Anonymous letter addressed to Prince Dolgorukov, 
1863).
39 M. N. Katkov, 1863 god: Sobranie statei po pol´skomu voprosu (Moscow: Universitetskaia 
tipografiia, 1887), 1:278. On the publicist’s earlier views, consult Miller, Ukrainian Question, 
85–86.
40 Katkov, 1863 god, 1:277. 
41 “P. V. Annenkov to Prince Dolgurukov, 17 March 1863” (RGIA f. 1282, op. 1, d. 166, ll. 
4, 4 ob.–5).
42 Saunders, “Russia and Ukraine,” 28–29. 
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ministries could more fully review the full implications of Ukrainophile 
activities. Insisting that the Little Russian “dialect” was merely a version of 
Russian “corrupted by Polish influence,” Valuev paraphrased Katkov in what 
would become the circular’s most infamous line—“there was not, is not, and 
cannot be any distinct [osobyi] Little Russian language.”43 Despite protests 
from Kiev Ukrainophiles and the minister of education—and a warning from 
the Third Section itself that repressive measures directed at Ukrainophiles 
might entice them to respond to the overtures that recently had been made 
by Polish agitators—the circular remained in effect until Valuev left office in 
1868, severely restricting Ukrainian publishing ventures.44 
However, Valuev’s measures, which aimed to mitigate the specific risk 
that Polish patriots would use Ukrainophile ideas for their own benefit, 
did not interfere with activists’ ongoing efforts to write a history of Little 
Russia and to promote and protect folk culture, which officials continued 
to view as activities that reinforced rather than threatened imperial unity.45 
Indeed, as the de-Polonization campaign again intensified following the 
1863 revolt, Kiev’s Ukrainophile activists secured a more prominent role 
in local intellectual life and maintained official support for many of their 
ventures.46 Khlopomany and hromadtsy flocked to the Commission for the 
Analysis of Historical Documents, whose new president, Iuzefovich, now 
touted the group’s ability to “expose the true history of the Western region, 
establish its true relationship to Poland and Russia, [and] dispel false notions 
intentionally spread by Polish historians and publicists.”47 Antonovich, who 
became editor of the group’s official publication in 1863, used the forum to 
celebrate the role of the Little Russian masses in the centuries-long “bloody 
battle” to cast off the alleged “yoke” of Polish and Jewish domination.48 The 
43 See the version of Valuev’s circular reprinted in Miller, Ukrainian Question, 265–66.
44 Ibid., 119–25, 128–30; Memorandum of N. V. Mezentsov, 7 November 1863 (RGIA f. 
1282, op. 1, d. 166, ll. 28–35 ob.). Thirty-three Ukrainian-language books were published 
in the Russian Empire in 1862. By 1868, that number had dropped to one (Remy, “Valuev 
Circular,” 97).
45 This point is made strongly in Saunders, “Russia and Ukraine,” 31–32. 
46 On new efforts to strip the szlachta of their noble ranks and to force them off the land, 
consult Daniel Beauvois, La bataille de la terre en Ukraine, 1863–1914: Les Polonais et les conflits 
socio-ethniques (Lille: Presses universitaires de Lille, 1993); Theodore Weeks, Nation and State 
in Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914 (DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1996); and Rodkiewicz, Russian Nationality Policy.
47 Levitskii, Piatidesiatiletie, 108; see also the 1866 letter from Iuzefovich to Galagan reprinted 
in Savchenko, Zaborona ukrainstva, 364.
48 Arkhiv iugo-zapadnoi Rossii 3, 3 (Kiev: I. Zavadskii, 1876), 1–128; Arkhiv iugo-zapadnoi 
Rossii 1, 2 (Kiev: Fedorov, 1864), ii. See also Antonovich’s introduction to Arkhiv iugo-
zapadnoi Rossii 3, 1 (Kiev: Davidenko, 1863), i–cxx.
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Kiev governor-general’s office applauded the group’s activities, quadrupling 
its annual subsidy (now funded by the special taxes levied on the szlachta).49 
In the 1860s–70s, Antonovich and a young colleague from the Hromada, 
M. P. Dragomanov, conducted (and published legally) a massive study of 
Ukrainian-language folksongs, which highlighted the suffering of the Little 
Russian people under Polish rule—and lavished praise on the imperial 
authorities working to de-Polonize their native land.50
If the Valuev decree frustrated Ukrainophiles’ attempts to reach out to the 
masses, they soon found new means of introducing their ideas to a broader 
public. In 1864, V. Ia. Shul´gin, a professional historian and a member of 
the commission, used funds that he had gathered from his colleagues in 
the group to establish Kiev’s first daily newspaper, Kievlianin.51 The paper 
(whose title alluded to Maksimovich’s earlier venture), aimed to acquaint 
readers across the empire with the unique history and special needs of the 
southwestern borderlands, raising awareness of the cultural traditions of 
the Little Russian people—and their continued suffering under the “triple 
yoke of Catholic clergy, Poles (landlords, rentiers, and estate managers) and 
Jews.”52 Reflecting the “radical democratism” that prevailed among Kiev’s 
Ukrainophile intelligentsia, the paper published historical retrospectives of 
the role that Hromada members had played in combating Polish influence 
and lauded Dragomanov’s ethnographic research (indeed, the young scholar-
activist was a founding member of the paper’s editorial board).53 
Perhaps the most impressive attempt of Kiev’s Ukrainophile activists to 
project their power and to cultivate a public sympathetic to their agenda can 
be seen in their campaign to erect a monument to Bogdan Khmel´nitskii in 
49 Sbornik statei i materialov po istorii iugo-zapadnoi Rossii, 14–15.
50 Drahomanov, “Malorossiia i ee slovesnosti” (1869), in Vybrane, esp. 40–41. For the 
completed study, see M. P. Dragomanov and V. B. Antonovich, Istoricheskie pesni malorusskogo 
naroda, 2 vols. (Kiev: M. P. Frits, 1874–75).
51 “Shul´gin, Vitalii Iakovlevich,” in Biograficheskii slovar´ professorov i prepodavatelei 
imperatorskogo universiteta Sv. Vladimira (1834–1884), ed. V. S. Ikonnikov (Kiev: Imperatorskii 
universitet Sv. Vladimira, 1884), 770; “Vitalii Iakovlevich Shul´gin,” in Kievlianin (Kiev: I. I. 
Zavadskii, 1880) 1–6, 8–11; Tarasenko, Stanovlennia ta rozvytok istorychnoi osvity, 45. 
52 Quoted from an 1864 essay reprinted as “Iugo-zapadnyi krai pod upravleniem D.  G. 
Bibikova,” Drevniaia i novaia Rossiia, no. 6 (1879): 89.
53 Quoted from Drahomanov, “Avtobiograficheskaia zametka,” 47. See also “Zapiski 
ob universitetskoi zhizni (1860–1864),” Kievlianin, 25 August 1864, 1; Drahomanov, 
“Malorossiia,” 42; and “Ob˝iavlenie,” Kievlianin, 1 July 1864, 1. Historians typically 
characterize Shul´gin and his paper as proponents of Ukrainophobia and Great Russian 
chauvinism. In fact, he was an active participant in the Kiev experiment through the 1870s 
and as late as 1874 praised the Ukrainian-language operas of Hromada member N. V. Lysenko 
(“Novaia malorusskaia opera,” Kievlianin, 2 February 1874, 1).
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the city. In the aftermath of the 1863 revolt, Iuzefovich convened a working 
group under the Commission for the Analysis of Historical Documents to 
collect money and rally support for the project, which had first been proposed 
by Maksimovich in the 1850s.54 By the late 1860s, the group had enlisted 
the St. Petersburg-based sculptor M. O. Mikeshin in the project. Famed for 
his intricate creations and his pride in the empire—he had completed the 
monument to the millennium of Russia in Novgorod in 1859 and would 
finish his homage to Catherine the Great in St. Petersburg in 1873—Mikeshin 
shared the radically populist views of many commission members. The son of 
a poor Belorusian family whose arts studies had been funded by a local noble 
awed by his talent, the sculptor was a close friend and long-time collaborator 
of Taras Shevchenko, who lauded his “democratic worldview.”55 
During an 1869 visit to Mikeshin’s studio, Alexander II noticed a model 
of a Cossack on horseback and inquired about it. Mikeshin explained to the 
tsar that “in Ukraine [na Ukraine] under the influence of the Polish uprising, a 
broad-based desire to celebrate the patriotic service of Hetman Khmel´nitskii, 
who joined Ukraine to Russia, had arisen.”56 Alexander expressed his approval 
for the project, and several months later, Mikeshin completed a model of the 
hetman on horseback.57 In the sculptor’s words, under the steed’s hooves lay 
broken chains and the “body of a Jesuit or a priest, almost completely covered 
by a broken Polish flag that is full of holes… . Lower, on a ledge, there is a 
fallen but still living Polish noble, and still lower … a Yid in the last throes 
of death caught red-handed [u kotorogo ruki zastyli ], holding religious vessels 
and items and money.”58 These figures, Mikeshin later explained, “depict the 
54 M. A. Maksimovich, “Pis´ma o Bogdane Khmel´nitskom k M. P. Pogodinu,” Ukrainets, 
no. 1 (1859): 151.
55 A. M. Umanskii, “Pamiati M. O. Mikeshina,” Istoricheskii vestnik 67, 2 (1897): 625, 650. 
Mikeshin illustrated Ukrainian-language publications of Shevchenko’s Kobzar: see M.  O. 
Mikeshin, ed., Kobzar (St. Petersburg: P. A. Kulish, 1860); and N. I. Kostomarov and M. O. 
Mikeshin, eds., Kobzar (Prague: Nakladem knihkupectvi dra Grega a Ferd. Dattla, 1876). 
56 M. G., “Istoriia odnogo pamiatnika,” Golos minuvshego, no. 7 (1913): 284. For more on 
this initial encounter, see TsDIAK f. 873 (Iuzefovich, M. V.), op. 1, d. 48, ll. 48–48 ob. (M. O. 
Mikeshin to M. V. Iuzefovich, 10 February 1869).
57 Mikeshin modeled the statue’s face on historical portraits of Khmel´nitskii and borrowed 
Cossack garb and weapons from Antonovich’s personal collection. See DAK f. 301 (Komitet po 
sooruzheniiu v g. Kieve pamiatnika Bogdanu Khmel´nitskomu), op. 1, d. 8, l. 32 (“Opisanie 
Vysochaishe uchrezhdennogo proekta pamiatnik,” c. 1873); and “Pamiatnik Bogdanu 
Khmel´nitskomu,” Kievskaia starina 22, 7 (1888): 145–56. 
58 Mikeshin to Iuzefovich, 19 February 1869 (TsDIAK f. 873, op. 1, d. 48, l. 30 ob.); see also 
M. G., “Istoriia odnogo pamiatnika,” 284.
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three enemies against whom Khmel´nitskii fought so gloriously in Ukraine, 
assisting in the political death of Poland.”59
The model melded expressions of Little Russian patriotism with reminders 
of the ways that Ukrainophilism reinforced imperial unity. The pedestal 
supporting the hetman portrayed a kobzar [Ukrainian itinerant poet] who bore 
a striking resemblance to Taras Shevchenko and conveyed the “democratic” 
spirit of the monument; gathered around him were figures of Great, White, 
Little, and Galician Russian ethnographic types.60 An inscription on the front 
of the monument read, “A united, indivisible Russia—to Hetman Bogdan 
Khmel´nitskii”; scenes of the hetman’s military victories over Polish forces 
and the names of “heroes of Little Russian Cossackdom” were emblazoned on 
the four corners of the pedestal.61 Below the horse’s hooves, Mikeshin added 
a traditional Ukrainian folksong of the 17th century recently published by 
Dragomanov: “Oh, it will be better / oh, it will be more beautiful / When in 
our Ukraine / There are no Jews, no Poles /  And no Union.”62
In 1870, Governor-General A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov received formal 
permission to convene a committee to see the monument to fruition. Chaired 
by Iuzefovich, the group featured a familiar cast of characters, including 
Antonovich, Maksimovich, and Rigel´man.63 Consistent with the pattern 
we have seen earlier, Iuzefovich insisted that the planning must be a “truly 
popular matter.” While Kievlianin admiringly reviewed popular histories of 
Khmel´nitskii’s campaigns—quoting Mikeshin’s “folksong” in one article64—
committee members worked to “compile a short but very clear note about 
Khmel´nitskii’s meaning for Russian history” and circulated appeals for 
funding that welcomed “donations of a few cents from simple people.”65
59 “Opisanie Vysochaishe uchrezhdennogo proekta pamiatnika,” c. 1873 (DAK f. 301, op. 1, 
d. 8, l. 32).
60 M. G., “Istoriia odnogo pamiatnika,” 284–85; on the monument’s “democratic” message, 
see TsDIAK f. 873, op. 1, d. 48, l. 29 ob.
61 On “united, indivisible Russia,” see Mikeshin to Iuzefovich, 2 January 1869 (TsDIAK f. 
873, op. 1, d. 48, l. 45). On the military victories and inscriptions, see DAK f. 301, op. 1, d. 
8, l. 32; and TsDIAK f. 873, op. 1, d. 48, l. 29.
62 M. G., “Istoriia odnogo pamiatnika,” 284–85. “Union” refers to the 1596 Union of Brest, 
which subordinated the Ruthenian church to the Catholic pope. 
63 “Protokol zasedaniia Komiteta po sboru prinoshenii na sooruzhenie pamiatnika Bogdanu 
Khmel´nitskomu v Kieve,” 16 May 1870 (DAK f. 301, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 2–3 ob.); “Pamiatnik 
Bogdanu Khmel´nitskomu,” 149. 
64 “Po povodu odnoi knizhki,” Kievlianin, 27 June 1868, 1–2.
65 Iuzefovich to Dondukov-Korsakov, 10 February 1870 (DAK f. 301, op. 1, d. 3, l. 14); see 
also Iuzefovich’s notes on the matter in ibid., l. 10.
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The official sanctioning of the Khmel´nitskii project marked the apex 
of the Little Russian lobby’s power, and activists quickly moved to capitalize 
on their influence. In 1872, Shul´gin, Iuzefovich, and Hromada leaders 
convinced the authorities to authorize the establishment of a chapter of 
the Imperial Geographic Society in Kiev. The society’s founders hoped that 
“Ukrainian self-organization” and organized research projects on Cossack 
history, Ukrainian literature, and regional demographics could “counteract 
Mikeshin’s original blueprint for the Khmel´nitskii monument  
Source: A. M. Umanskii, “Pamiati M. O. Mikeshina,”  
Istoricheskii vestnik, no. 2 (1897).
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the Polish [culture] that was still powerful in the region.”66 The establishment 
of the Kiev Geographic Society also began a renaissance in Ukrainian-language 
publishing ventures, which rebounded to their pre-1863 limits by 1874.67 
On the occasion of the group’s opening, Chubinskii, who had returned to 
Kiev after his exile, celebrated its potential simultaneously to promote local 
culture, discredit Polish claims on the western borderlands, and strengthen 
the empire.68 Dondukov-Korsakov lauded the patriotic service of society 
members, as officials in his office discussed how best to reward Antonovich, 
who had played a critical role in organizing the group.69 
The 1863 revolt raised concern among officials that Polish agitators might 
turn Little Russian ethno-national consciousness against the empire, but it 
did not end their efforts to employ Ukrainophile ideas as a weapon in the de-
Polonization campaign. If Little Russian activists found their opportunities to 
publish in Ukrainian limited in the immediate aftermath of the insurrection—
and the need to demonstrate that their activities reinforced imperial unity 
more pressing—they in fact reached the height of their influence after the 
Valuev decree. Local officials endorsed and financially supported numerous 
Ukrainophile efforts to reach out to an expanding urban public, and the tsar 
himself approved the Khmel´nitskii statue, which heralded the imminent 
arrival of a future in which Little Russians—regardless of their class status—
could reclaim their native land from their putative national enemies. 
The Demise of the Kiev Experiment
Recognizing that the battle against Polish-Catholic civilization could not be 
won without the ethno-national mobilization of Kiev’s Orthodox population, 
officials had relied on Ukrainophiles to help them claim the southwestern 
borderlands for the empire. By the 1870s, however, as the imminent political 
threat posed by the region’s Poles began to wane, bureaucrats became more 
attuned to the ways that the activities of Kiev activists had undermined the 
66 The 1872 request to incorporate the society is reprinted in Savchenko, Zaborona ukrainstva, 
233–34. See also P. P. Chubinskii, ed., Trudy etnografichesko-statisticheskoi ekspeditsii v Zapadno-
russkii krai (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskoe russkoe geograficheskoe obshchestvo, 1872); and 
Ihnat Zhytets´kyi, “Pivdenno-Zakhidnyi viddil geografichnoho tovarystva u Kyivi,” Ukraina, 
no. 5 (1927): 33.
67 Thirty-two Ukrainian books were approved by censors in 1874, just one short of the 
number published in 1863 (Remy, “Valuev Circular,” 97). Remy improbably attributes this 
rebound in Ukrainian publishing to corruption within the Kiev censorship apparatus, failing 
to note that it is fully consistent with the influence that Ukrainophiles enjoyed in local politics 
in the late 1860s and early 1870s.
68 Cited in Savchenko, Zaborona ukrainstva, 31.
69 Miller, Ukrainian Question, 161. 
UKRAINOPHILE ACTIVISM AND IMPERIAL GOVERNANCE 319
tsarist order. Censors expressed concern that Kievlianin regularly denounced 
state policies (the paper often lamented that official efforts to protect the 
interests of the borderlands’ simple folk had proven inadequate).70 They 
also complained that local activists’ publications aimed at the simple folk 
employed “excessively harsh” rhetoric when discussing the influence of the 
city’s non-Orthodox population, leading uneducated readers to potentially 
“dangerous” conclusions.71
Meanwhile, elite government figures began to reconsider their support 
for the Khmel´nitskii monument. By the early 1870s, Alexander II’s brother, 
Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, openly denounced the statue as divisive; 
the tsar himself qualified his initial enthusiasm for the project, ordering that 
the ritual objects be removed from the hands of the Jew and the trampled 
Polish standard from under the feet of the Jesuit.72 A public exhibition of a 
model of the statue in Kiev in 1872 provoked further controversy. Charging 
that the depiction of the hetman’s violent defeat of the priest, Polish noble, 
and Jew promoted the “incitement of national hatred” and the “kindling of 
antisocial passions” [razzhiganie antisotsial´nykh strastei], the city’s Catholic 
community railed against the project.73 Concurring that the statue would 
stand as a “shameful pillory” to the “Catholic-Polish and Jewish” residents 
who encountered it, N. A. Rigel´man resigned from the committee 
overseeing the statue’s completion.74 In spite of this opposition, however, 
leading Ukrainophile activists resolutely defended the project. Denouncing 
the statue’s critics, Kievlianin insisted that “neither the Polish landlord nor the 
priest nor the Jew has yet been cast off the precipice; this region is still put to 
the test by their tenacity.”75 
70 For example, see TsDIAK f. 293 (Kievskii tsenzurnyi komitet), op. 1, d. 828 (Ob izdanii 
gazety “Kievlianin,” 1864–1875). 
71 Report of Kiev censor, 23 June 1868 (TsDIAK f. 294, op. 1, d. 59, l. 1).
72 The grand duke’s opposition is mentioned in Mikeshin to Iuzefovich, 9 February 1872 
(TsDIAK f. 873, op. 1, d. 48, l. 23). On the tsar’s evolving attitude, see TsDIAK f. 442 
(Kantseliariia Kievskogo, Podol´skogo, i Volynskogo general-gubernatora), op. 28, d. 232, 
ch. 1, l. 2 (Committee to Mikeshin, 18 October 1869); Mikeshin to Main Admiralty, 10 
November 1869 (ibid., l. 6); Mikeshin to Dondukov-Korsakov, 16 November 1869 (ibid., l. 
8); and Mikeshin to Iuzefovich, 10 November 1869 (ibid., ll. 31–31 ob.).
73 N.V—tskii, “Vnutrennie izvestiia,” Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti, 12 November 1872, 
second pagination, 1. 
74 “Mnenie po protokolu zasedaniia Komiteta po sooruzhenii pamiatnika Bogdana 
Khmel´nitskomu ot 8 oktobria 1872 goda” (TsDIAK f. 442, op. 28, d. 232, ch. 1, ll. 33–34 ob.).
75 “Po povodu pamiatnika Bogdanu Khmel´nitskomu,” Kievlianin, 18 November 1872, 2. 
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Eager to avoid further delays in the project’s realization, Governor-General 
Dondukov-Korsakov and Iuzefovich attempted to craft a compromise.76 
In December 1872, Iuzefovich suggested that all figures except for the 
horseman, a pair of broken chains lying under the horse’s hooves—a “symbol 
of the trampling of Polish oppression”—and the broken Polish banner (which 
Alexander II had already directed Mikeshin to omit) be removed from the 
model.77 Mikeshin balked, refusing “under any circumstances” to change the 
project unless a “higher political authority” demanded it.78 In February 1873, 
Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich visited Mikeshin’s studio and berated 
the artist, informing him that the project could continue only if the figures 
of Khmel´nitskii’s adversaries were omitted and the overall “meaning” of the 
monument altered.79 Following the encounter between Mikeshin and the 
grand duke, the committee received permission to conclude a contract with 
the sculptor to build a large model of the horseman alone; to ensure that 
he maintained adequate control over the project, Konstantin Nikolaevich 
secured metal for the statue from the budget of the Naval Ministry, which 
he controlled.80
In 1878, Alexander II again was invited to Mikeshin’s studio to review 
the final version of the model. Presumably in an attempt to appease the tsar, 
the sculptor had diluted the Little Russian patriotism expressed in the initial 
model, replacing the folksong that had once graced the pedestal with the 
inscription, “Let us follow the Orthodox Tsar of the East.”81 Alexander was 
horrified, however, to discover that the body of a Jesuit covered by a Polish 
banner had reappeared in this new iteration and demanded that all figures 
besides the horseman be “completely removed.”82 The order provoked an 
angry response from Mikeshin, but it also confused the committee, which 
76 Dondukov-Korsakov to Timashev, undated (DAK f. 301, op. 1, d. 8, l. 60).
77 Quoted from “Kopiia s protokola zasedaniia Komiteta uchrezhdennogo pri Kievskoi 
arkheograficheskoi kommissii dlia sooruzheniia v g. Kieve pamiatnika Bogdanu 
Khmel´nitskomu ot 5 iiunia 1874 goda” (TsDIAK f. 442, op. 28, d. 232, ch. 1, ll. 101–1 ob.); 
and Iuzefovich to Dondukov-Korsakov, 31 Dec 1872 (ibid., l. 40).
78 Mikeshin to Dondukov-Korsakov, undated correspondence (ibid., l. 55). 
79 On this incident, see Mikeshin to Iuzefovich, 8 February 1873 (TsDIAK f. 873, op. 1, d. 
48, ll. 20 ob.–22 ob.); Mikeshin to Iuzefovich, 24 May 1888 (ibid., ll. 3–3 ob.); quoted from 
Dondukov-Korsakov to Timashev, undated (DAK f. 301, op. 1, d. 8, l. 61).
80 Iuzefovich to Dondukov-Korsakov, 24 March 1873 (TsDIAK f. 442, op. 28, d. 232, ch. 
1, l. 57). 
81 Maksimovich attributed these words to Khmel´nitskii (Vospominanie o Bogdane 
Khmel´nitskom, 68). 
82 Ministry of the Interior to M. I. Chertkov, 7 May 1878 (TsDIAK f. 442, op. 28, d. 232, 
ch. 1, l. 160).
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claimed that it was not clear whether Alexander wanted both the Jesuit and 
the flag removed, or merely the human figure omitted.83
Desperate to salvage the original intent of the monument, the committee 
quickly ruled that the tsar’s demand should be interpreted narrowly: the 
Jesuit could be eliminated, but the broken standard must be retained as a 
“symbol of Khmel´nitskii’s trampling of Polish dominion.”84 As Iuzefovich 
explained the committee’s reasoning to the governor-general: “the sense of 
His Majesty’s command relates to a religious sentiment—the fact that it is not 
pleasant to be trampled under the feet of the horse, even for a Jesuit—and 
not the political sentiment expressed in the form of a broken standard—the 
historical fact of the liberation of the Russian regions from foreign slavery, 
which serves as the very basis of the idea of the monument.”85 In March 1880, 
however, the committee’s ruling was overturned: the Ministry of the Interior 
confirmed that the tsar had indeed meant that all flourishes, including the 
Polish standard, must be removed, and that the monument should “consist 
only of a single figure of Bogdan Khmel´nitskii on horseback.”86 In 1888, the 
figure of a lone horseman was erected in front of St. Sophia’s Cathedral in 
central Kiev, where it still stands today.
Increasing scrutiny of the Kiev experiment by elite figures within the 
government sowed rancor within the ranks of Little Russian activists. In 
the early 1870s, M. P. Dragomanov began to challenge the leadership of the 
Little Russian lobby in high society circles as well as in print. The young 
publicist denounced Kiev intellectuals—including his mentor, Shul´gin—
for the passivity he saw in their attempts to conform to the letter of the 
Valuev decree while failing adequately to contest the serious charges that 
Ukrainophile activities were products of a “Polish intrigue.”87 Many of 
the younger members of the Kiev chapter of the Imperial Geographic 
Society sided with Dragomanov, who along with Chubinskii began to 
83 “O voznagrazhdenii Mikeshina za rabotu po sooruzheniiu novogo znasheni na pamiatnike 
Bogdanu Khmel´nitskomu,” 14 June 1878 (ibid., l. 201).
84 “Protokol,” 1 June 1878 (DAK f. 301, op. 1, d. 8, l. 217).
85 “Dokladnaia zapiska,” 11 February 1880 (TsDIAK f. 442, op. 28, d. 232, ch. 1, l. 232 ob.). 
86 M. I. Chertkov to Committee, 21 March 1880 (DAK f. 301, op. 1, d. 8, l. 295); Ministry 
of the Interior to Chertkov, 8 March 1880 (TsDIAK f. 442, op. 28, d. 232, ch. 1, l. 234).
87 “Avtobiograficheskaia zametka,” in Mykhailo Petrovych Drahomanov, 1:57–60; “Literatura 
Rosiis´ka, Velykorus´ka, ukrains´ka i halyts´ka,” in ibid., 1:169. The latter work is the full 
text of a long article serialized in the Galician journal Pravda in 1873. If Dragomanov urged 
Ukrainophiles to explore more radical tactics, through the mid-1870s he continued to view 
Little Russian culture as a complement to—not a competitor of—all-imperial patriotism. See 
Anatolii Kruhlashov, Drama intelektuala: Politychni idei Mykhaila Drahomanova (Chernivtsi: 
Prut, 2000), 293. 
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play a more prominent role in the group. In 1873 elections, Geographic 
Society members elected Chubinskii to the ranks of the group’s leaders and 
relegated Iuzefovich and Shul´gin to largely symbolic positions, excluding 
them from the planning of the regional census and archeological congress 
that the society undertook (with the extensive cooperation of the local 
authorities) in 1874.88 
Eager to seek revenge against the colleagues who had slighted them, 
Shul´gin and Iuzefovich initiated a propaganda campaign against the 
Geographic Society. In an 1874 editorial in Kievlianin, Shul´gin claimed 
that leaders of the society had rejected prospective members who could not 
speak Ukrainian, chiding them for subordinating the cause of imperial unity 
to narrower Little Russian interests—a tactic reminiscent of Katkov’s assault 
on the Ukrainophiles in 1863.89 Several months later, in the presence of 
Dondukov-Korsakov, Iuzefovich charged that Chubinskii, Dragomanov, and 
their closest associates were Ukrainian separatists.90 Supporters of Chubinskii 
and Dragomanov, who had assumed editorial control of the daily Kievskii 
telegraf, used the paper to refute charges that their activities were in any 
way subversive, pointing out that “Little Russian patriots” had long been 
conducting their activities on a legal basis with the full knowledge and support 
of the authorities.91 The governor-general’s office, for its part, chose not to get 
involved in what it regarded as a private dispute; local censors even refused 
to print Iuzefovich’s 1875 letter of resignation from the Geographic Society, 
88 F. Volkov, “P. P. Chubinskii,” Ukrainskaia zhizn´, no. 1 (1914): 47, 52–53; Trudy tret´ego 
arkheologicheskogo s˝ezda v Rossii byvshego v Kieve v avguste 1874 goda, 3 vols. (Kiev: Tipografiia 
Imperatorskogo universiteta sv. Vladimira, 1878). On the growing rift in Little Russian 
society, see O. F. Kistiakivs´kyi, Shchodennyk (1874–1885) (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1994), 
1:28; Savchenko, Zaborona ukrainstva, 32–60; Miller, Ukrainian Question, 162–63. 
89 Kievlianin, 3 October 1874, 1.
90 Zhytets´kyi, “Pivdenno-zakhidnyi viddil geografichnoho tovarystva,” 34–35; Kistiakivs´kyi, 
Shchodennyk, 1:64; Drahomanov, “Avtobiograficheskaia zametka,” 55–64. One of Iuzefovich’s 
friends later noted that the elder statesman was seeking revenge on multiple accounts. Around 
the time that Iuzefovich was ousted from the leadership of the Geographic Society, his son, 
Boris, was arrested in a homosexual dragnet. Angered that his local rivals mockingly sent him 
tabloid coverage of the sensational trial that followed, Iuzefovich vowed to seek revenge against 
his “Ukrainian” enemies. See Nikolai Vasylenko, “Akademyk Orest Ivanovych Levyts´kyi,” 
Zapysky Sotsial´no-ekonomichnoho viddilu Ukrains´koi akademii nauk, no. 1 (1923): lxxiv.
91 Vydumki “Kievlianina” i pol´skikh gazet o malorusskom patriotizme (Kiev: Kievskii telegraf, 
1874). In their private correspondence, members of Kiev’s Little Russian community also 
expressed shock and confusion at the charges made by Iuzefovich and Shul´gin. See the 
documents contained in Arkhiv Mykhaila Drahomanova: Lystuvannia Kyivs´koi staroi Hromady 
z M. Drahomanovym (1870–1895 r.r.) (Warsaw, 1937). 
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noting that it accused of sedition individuals whose political reliability had 
never been questioned.92 
Barred from airing his complaints in the local press, Iuzefovich composed 
a manifesto describing the subversive program of the “so-called Ukrainian 
movement” and distributed it in elite bureaucratic circles. Iuzefovich began 
his tract by noting the many junctures at which Little Russian patriotism 
had reinforced the power of the imperial state and the Orthodox Church.93 
He continued to explain that beginning in the 1860s, however, the Osnova 
circle—to which, he failed to mention, he himself had belonged—had 
attempted to use growing awareness of Little Russian culture to undermine 
local support for the government rather than rally it.94 Iuzefovich lamented 
that these subversive tendencies had only grown more prominent in recent 
years, as Chubinskii and Dragomanov had assumed influence in the 
Geographic Society and Kievskii telegraf. Charging that Kiev Ukrainophiles 
had promoted separatist and revolutionary ideas among both peasants and 
the educated classes and that their efforts to promote the Ukrainian language 
undermined the “wholeness of the state,” Iuzefovich insisted that officials 
intervene quickly and decisively.95 
Alarmed by Iuzefovich’s allegations, the Ministry of the Interior launched 
a special commission to investigate “Ukrainophile propaganda” emanating 
from Kiev and invited Iuzefovich to join.96 Throughout the investigation, 
officials showed remarkable deference to Iuzefovich, soliciting his feedback on 
the memoranda prepared by the ministries participating in the commission.97 
On 18 May 1876, following the completion of the commission’s final 
report—which included large segments of Iuzefovich’s writings on the matter 
verbatim—Alexander II issued a decree from the German spa town of Ems.98 
92 TsDIAK f. 293 (Kievskii tsenzurnyi komitet), op. 1, d. 828 (“Ob izdanii gazety ‘Kievlianin’ ”), 
ll. 54–54 ob. (Memorandum of Kiev censor to Ministry of the Interior, 21 April 1875). 
93 “O tak nazyvaemom ukrainofil´skom dvizhenii,” c. 1875 (TsDIAK KMF-22, op. 1, d. 21, 
ll. 3–4).
94 Ibid., ll. 10–11. 
95 Ibid., ll. 23 ob., 27–27 ob.
96 “Kopiia s otnosheniia Glavnogo nachal´nika III otdeleniia Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskogo 
Velichestva Kantseliarii” (RGIA f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, l. 2).
97 For example, RGIA f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352 (Ministry of the Interior to Iuzefovich, 4 May 
1876), l. 79. 
98 On the findings of the commission, see RGIA f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, ll. 83–105 ob. 
Iuzefovich personally penned the first draft of this document, which also incorporated passages 
from an earlier memorandum to the commission. See “O vrede literaturnoi deiatel´nosti 
ukrainofilov i merakh k ego otvrashcheniiu” (ibid., ll. 23–32) and undated draft of report 
(ibid., ll. 105–18 ob.). 
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The infamous decree ordered Kievskii telegraf and the Kiev branch of the 
Geographic Society closed and prohibited publications (with the exception 
of historical documents) in the “Little Russian dialect.”99 Concurrent 
investigations of Dragomanov and Chubinskii concluded that the two 
exhibited a “Ukrainophilic orientation that does not correspond to the 
views of the government.” The former was relieved from his position at St. 
Vladimir’s and fled the Russian Empire, while the latter was exiled from the 
Little Russian provinces in the wake of the Ems Decree.100
Intended to counteract the threat that Ukrainophile ideologies would 
evolve into national separatism, the Ems Decree only fractured and polarized 
former Little Russian activists, driving them into hostile and well-defined 
groups of Ukrainian and Russian nationalists. The victims of the measure 
turned the cultural consciousness and popular mobilization techniques that 
they had refined under official tutelage against the imperial state. Dragomanov, 
who remained in exile for the rest of his life, now added “the bureaucratic 
overlords [pany]…, the Moscow overlords” to the ranks of the foreign 
oppressors of the Ukrainian simple folk.101 Meanwhile, the allies of Iuzefovich 
and Shul´gin—many themselves veterans of Osnova and the Hromada—
presented their former colleagues as a subversive “Ukrainian party” that 
promoted “enmity toward central Russia.”102 These self-proclaimed “Russian 
nationalists” found refuge in Kievlianin, which perceived Ukrainophile 
turncoats supported by Polish and Jewish conspirators lurking behind every 
corner.103 
By the early 20th century, the Russian and Ukrainian nationalists 
struggling for control of Kiev had produced works that expunged the Kiev 
experiment from the historical record. Histories written by elderly veterans 
of the Commission for the Analysis of Historical Documents portrayed the 
 99 The edict is reprinted in Miller, Ukrainian Question, 267–69.
100 See RGIA f. 1282, op. 1, d. 374. (The quotation, which refers to Dragomanov, is found 
on l. 53.) Throughout the investigation, local notables and officials attempted to intervene on 
Chubinskii’s behalf, insisting that he harbored no separatist sympathies.
101 Hromada, no. 2 (1878): 570. 
102 Quoted from S. S. Gogotskii, a member of the Commission for the Analysis of Historical 
Documents and the Osnova editorial board: Eshche neskol´ko slov ob ukrainofilakh (Moscow, 
1875), 2. Other one-time radical Ukrainophile activists who ultimately joined the “Russian” 
camp included N. A. Rigel´man, the historian O. I. Levitskii, the publicist I. M. Reva, 
and the historians Andrei and Nikolai Storozhenko. See Z. [Rigel´man], “Sovremennoe 
ukrainofil´stvo,” Russkii vestnik, no. 2 (1875): 838–68; Hrushevs´kyi, “Orest Levits´kyi,” 200; 
Kistiakivs´kyi, Shchodennyk, 1:176; and Mykola Storozhenko, Z moho zhyttia (Kyiv: Lybid´, 
2005).
103 For example, “Narodnaia shkola na iuge Rossii,” Kievlianin, 14 February 1881, 1; and 
Andrei Ivanov, “Po povodu khokhlomanii,” Kievlianin, 8 March 1881, 2. 
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khlopomany as Polish and Jewish agents who had attempted to destroy the 
Russian Empire;104 Iuzefovich’s son, Boris, and Shul´gin’s son, Vasilii, who 
emerged as theoreticians of Russian nationalism in the 1905 period, obscured 
the role that their fathers had played in promoting Ukrainian culture and 
language.105 Meanwhile, Ukrainian nationalists masked the key role that 
local bureaucrats had played in advancing Little Russian consciousness. The 
historian Mykhailo Hrushevs´kyi, Antonovich’s protégé and himself a former 
member of the Commission for the Analysis of Historical Documents, 
presented the 19th century as a long struggle between Ukrainian national 
awakeners and an oppressive, Russifying bureaucracy; indeed, following his 
mentor’s death, Hrushevs´kyi penned a biographical sketch that chronicled 
Antonovich’s life-long struggle against imperial rule.106 
Conclusion
The unprecedented threat posed by the Polish insurrections of the 19th century 
compelled Russian officials to search for new ways to unify the imperial body 
politic. Seeing as much positive potential as dangerous influence in ethno-
national ideas, bureaucrats permitted Ukrainophile activists to use official 
institutions to consolidate a national history, promote Little Russian culture, 
and even to forge new relationships between elites and the masses—all of 
which they hoped would challenge Polish power and reinforce Orthodox 
claims on Kiev. If officials vigilantly policed expressions of Ukrainophile 
activities that they feared would give aid to national enemies or encourage 
separatism, they overtly encouraged others that they believed would promote 
imperial unity. The Kiev experiment thus represented an ambitious effort 
to reconcile imperial patriotism and national ideas, and to draw on the 
mobilizational power of ethno-national consciousness without unleashing 
the obvious threats that it posed to the imperial system.
Ultimately, however, the Kiev experiment destabilized imperial authority 
rather than revitalizing it. As various segments of officialdom had come to 
understand by the 1870s, Kiev Ukrainophiles’ efforts to help the Little Russian 
people reclaim their native land from their foreign “exploiters”—through 
104 Ia. Demchenko, Pravda ob ukrainofil´stve (Kiev: I. N. Kushnerev, 1906); A. V. Storozhenko, 
Proiskhozhdenie i sushchnost´ ukrainofil´stva (Kiev: S. V. Kul´zhenko, 1912). 
105 For example, B. M. Iuzefovich, Politicheskie pis´ma: Materialy dlia istorii russkogo 
politicheskogo umopomracheniia na rubezhe dvukh stoletii (1898–1908 gg.) (Kiev: Russkaia 
pechatnia, 1908); and V. V. Shulgin, Days of the Russian Revolution: Memoirs from the Right, 
1905–1917, trans. Bruce F. Adams (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1990).
106 For example, see Mikhail Grushevskii, Dvizhenie politicheskoi i obshchestvennoi ukrainskoi 
mysli v XIX stoletii (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia pol´za, 1907); on Antonovich, see 
Hrushevs´kyi, “Volodymyr Antonovych.”
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violence, if necessary—seriously undermined the ideological foundations 
of autocracy and intensified conflicts among the southwestern borderlands’ 
diverse population. Even as activists used their role in the de-Polonization 
campaign to enhance their social standing and political influence, figures such 
as Shul´gin and Iuzefovich manipulated official fears of national separatism 
to satisfy private agendas. The Ems Decree—the state’s most comprehensive 
attempt yet to manage the potential threat posed by Ukrainophile ideas—
only radicalized and polarized the Kiev intelligentsia, producing rival camps 
which used the ideas and techniques they had refined under state tutelage 
to pursue mutually opposed Ukrainian and Russian national projects. The 
Russian Empire could not survive the threat posed by Polish revanchism 
without drawing on the power of Little Russian patriotism. But it also could 
not withstand the nationalizing forces unleashed by the state itself, which 
officials poorly understood and ineffectively managed. 
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